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Abstract 
This paper aims at ranking the value of legal patent protection among countries, using the real options approach. In 
particular, we manage to overcome the problem of the lack of data for those countries that do not collect patent 
renewal data. The econometric technique we propose is well grounded in economic theory, specifically in the real 
options literature. Following this estimation strategy, we rank the value of legal patent protection for seventeen 
countries, closely reproducing other rankings based on surveys, for instance the PatVal survey by the EU Commission 
(2006), but relying on macro data publicly available and easy to access.
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,QWURGXFWLRQ
  On the one hand, human capital accumulation is  a crucial ingredient of  economic 
growth,  but  on  the  other  hand  its  measurement  still  remains  problematic.  In  economic 
literature two indictors of innovative activity have been widely used: R&D and patent counts. 
Nevertheless, the former is more clearly related to inputs into the innovative process rather 
than  to  the  successful  outputs  (Lanjouw  et  al.  1998),  while  the  latter  are  very  imprecise 
measures of innovative output, basically because most of the granted patents are worthless, 
giving rise to a skewed distribution of their true value (Lanjouw 1998, Lanjouw et al. 1998, 
Shankerman 1998, Van Zeebroeck 2008). In spite of this difficulty, it has been shown by 
several authors that patents play a crucial role in providing incentives to R&D (Shankerman 
1998,  Arora,  Ceccagnoli  2006,  Arora,  Ceccagnoli,  Cohen  2003  among  others),  therefore 
valuing patents becomes a crucial step in valuing innovation process output.  
To formulate good public policies on intellectual property rights, policy makers need 
to know whether, and to what extent, patent protection is effective in providing incentives to 
R&D  and  how  different  government  policies,  such  as  prosecution  of  infringements, 
restrictions on patent licensing and price restriction, may affect the effectiveness and the value 
of  patent  protection.  Since  patent  counts  are  not  a  reliable  indicator,  some  alternative 
methodologies have been developed to value patents and, roughly speaking, these can be 
classified as direct and indirect. In the former case, data is drawn from surveys, in which 
inventors  are  asked  to  assign  a  monetary  value  to  their  inventions.  This  technique  is 
particularly  costly  and  it  is  not  always  easily  accessible.  In  the  latter  case,  the  indirect 
technique is based on the idea that a patent owner will pay the initial and subsequent fees only 
if revenues exceed costs. Put another way, inventors are considered as having an option, they 
are not obliged to apply for, or to renew, a patent, but they make this decision only when it is 
economically feasible.  
Unfortunately, both datasets, micro data and renewal data, are not always available 
and they are not collected by every country.  
The purpose of this paper is to rank the value of patents granted by legal protection in 
spite of the problem of lack of data. This task is accomplished moving from a micro to a 
macro perspective, still remaining in the real options paradigm. Following this idea, we rank 
the  value  of  patent  legal  protection  for  seventeen  countries,  closely  reproducing  other 
rankings based on surveys, for instance the PatVal survey by the EU Commission (2006), but 
relying on macro data publicly available and easy to access. This result is useful in terms of 
policy-making because it allows policy makers to have an idea of the effectiveness of the 
efforts made to protect intellectual property and to foster innovation activity  
  The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 briefly reviews the real 
option models applied to patents. Section 3 puts forward an econometric strategy to rank the 
effectiveness of IP protection in a panel of countries and describes the dataset. Section 4 
shows  the  empirical  results  and  the  robustness  of  the  results  obtained. Finally,  section  5 
summarizes the results. 
   
5HYLHZRIUHDORSWLRQVOLWHUDWXUHDSSOLHGWRSDWHQWV
The original idea of comparing the patent renewal decision to a financial option was 
first formulated by Pakes (1986), followed by the contributions of Shankerman and Pakes 
(1986),  Pakes and  Simpson  (1989),  Shankerman  (1998),  Lanjouw  et al.  (1998),  Lanjouw 
(1998), among others.    2 
The real options theory
1 applied to patents considers patents as options the underlying of 
which is the expected cash flow generated by the project. The dynamic of the underlying 
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2  the  proportional  variance  parameter,  and  dz  the 
increment of the standard Wiener process, with E(dz)=0 and Var(dz)=dt. 
The patent, C(S,t), is a postive function of both, the present value of the expected cash flow, 
and the WLPHWRPDWXULW\ =T-t. As reported by empirical findings, Shankerman (1998) and all 
the papers dealing with renewal data, about 50% of patents drop out before they reach age ten 
and only a negligible part of those remaining reaches the last year of life, the twentieth. 
Therefore, one can reasonably assume the value of the patent to be independent of time, by 
simplifying the dependence C(S,t) to C(S). This step will turn out to be very useful in solving 
the PDE generated by applying Ito’s lemma to evaluate C(S). 
Very briefly, the value of the option, namely the patent, can therefore be written as  
C(S)=A1S
￿
                      (1) 
wKHUH 1  is  the  positive  solution  to  the  characteristic  equation 
0 ) 1 ( ) (
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and  A1  is a  constant determined by boundary conditions, (see Dixit and Pindyck (1994), 
p.152).  
This idea has been exploited in several empirical works by Bloom and Van Reenen 
(2002), Laxman and Aggarval (2003) and Schwartz (2004). In a recent contribution Wu and 
Tseng (2006) validate the theoretical relationships postulated by the real options theory. They 
directly test the reliability of the theory on a panel sample of Taiwanese firms. The patent 
citation index is taken as the proxy for the option, under the hypothesis that a highly cited 
patent,  namely  one  referred  to  by  many  subsequent  issued  patents,  is  likely  to  contain 
important technological advances (Thomas, McMillan, 2001). The underlying asset is proxied 
by the number of patents a firm has been granted at a given time (we will turn later to this 
point in more details). 
In spite of its potentials, this promising strand of empirical literature undergoes the 
non  negligible  limit  to  require  either  micro  data,  as  in  Wu  and  Tseng,  Bloom  and  Van 
Reenen,  or renewal data  such as in  Pakes,  Shankerman, Lanjouw et al,  Shankerman and 
Pakes, Pakes and Simpson. The next paragraph is devoted to overcome this problem using 
macro data, without abandoning Pake’s intuition. 
 
7KHPRGHODQGWKHGDWD
In the micro approach by Wu and Tseng a testable version of the theory has been 





































￿ U 6 & , , , 4 , 3 , 2 , 1 , e m s b b t b b a + + + + + + =             (6) 
where the signs of the estimated betas must be in accordance with those predicted by (2)-(5).  
                                                 
1 We do not go through the details of the theory because these are far beyond the scope of the paper, however for 
a complete, though dated, review on real option theory we refer the interested reader to Dixit and Pyndick 
(1994).   3 
Equation (6) has been estimated by fixed effects (FE) technique, µi,t, to take into account 
firms’ unobservable heterogeneity, using  a panel of 101 firms observed over 10 years. The 
data reveals that  4 is not significantly different from zero, while  1 2 DQG 3 take on the 
expected signs, making the authors argue that the theoretical framework cannot be rejected. 
Following this reasoning, we can even further by thinking of extending an application 
of (6) to macro data. This step could be very interesting for ranking patent protection systems 
across different countries.  
Let the subscript i=1…I denote a cross section of countries over a time period, t=1…T. 
Let us also assume that we have at our disposal good macro variables to proxy S, r and  &i is 
a  positive  function  of  patent  counts,  S,  capturing  the  global  value  of  patents  in  a  given 
economy. The critical point now is: what does the FE µi,t represent? 
The value of a patent can be defined as the income obtained by the owner with respect 
to the situation without patent, namely, the income that the patentee would not have had 
without the patent. Sometimes this entity is referred to as the patent premium. This premium 
can be broken down into two distinct components: the strictly speaking economic component 
and  the  legal  one.  The  former  component,  in  turn,  is  made  up  of  all  the  technical  and 
economic characteristics of the good that make the patent economically exploitable. It deals 
with the set of demand and supply characteristics related to the good the production of which 
is entitled by patent ownership. All these characteristics can be considered as accounted for 
by the economic variables postulated by real options theory and validated by Wu and Tseng 
(2006). The legal component, on the contrary, plays its role independently of  the former and 
pertains legal protection granted by law. This is the object we are interested in, because it is 
the  key  to  formulate  valid  policies  concerning  intellectual  property.  Indeed,  even  in  the 
presence of the most favourable economic characteristics of the patented good, if the law does 
not assure even a minimum defence to the patentees, patents turn out to be worthless. Thus, 
for given economic characteristics, the value of patents crucially depends on legal protection. 
The  effectiveness  of  legal  protection  may  vary,  and  indeed  it  varies,  among  different 
countries, and it may be captured in the FE µi,t of a macro version of equation (6). 
  It follows that estimating a macro version of (6) and retrieving the FE provides us with 
the possibility of ranking the effectiveness of legal protection in a panel of countries. To our 
knowledge,  so  far  this  task  has  been  pursued  in  economic  literature  only  through  patent 
renewal data, not always collected by all countries, or by relying on  DG KRFsurveys
2, not 
easily replicable because of the high cost of implementation. Therefore, this technique allows 
us to overcome the annoying problem of lack of data, without giving up this important and 
useful task. 
  As a good proxy for C(.) we take the OECD triadic patent families. A patent family is 
defined as a set of patents (originating from the priority filing) taken in various countries to 
protect the same invention. The triadic patent is a patent applied for thrice, at EPO (EU patent 
office), at USPTO (US patent office) and JPTO (Japan patent office) for the same patent. The 
underlying  assumption  made  in  using  triadic  patents  to  measure  the  patent  quality  (and 
therefore its value) is that triadic applications are filed only for valuable patents, and quite 
likely a triadic patent embodies important technological advances. It follows that the higher 
the patent counts in one country, the higher the probability of triadic patents, hence triadics 
can be regarded as a positive function of counts. The optionality of the choice consists in the 
fact that once has been filed an application for a patent, the patentee makes the decision of 
incurring the sunk cost of filing two other applications to obtain a triadic patent. 
Table I reports the analogy between the micro approach to patents as real options 
followed by Wu, Tseng and the macro approach followed in this paper 
                                                 
2 For instance, see Taylor, Silberston (1973); Mansfield, Schwartz, Wagner (1981); Levin et al. (1987); Cohen, 
Nelson,  Walsh (1996); Arora, Ceccagnoli, Cohen (2003) and Giuri et al. (2006).    4 
 




Average  number  of  patents 
owned  by  firm  i  (Si,t)  cited  by 
other firms’ patents 
Triadic patents by inventor of 
the  
i-th  country 
Si,t 
Underlying 
Number of patents a firm i has 
been granted at time t 
Number  of  patent  counts  by 
inventor at the EPO of the i-th  
country 
i,t  Lifetime of patents    
ri,t 
risk free interest rate 
Risk free interest rate  Risk  free  interest  rate  in 
government bonds  
i,t 
volatility  of  the  relative 
increment  in  the 
underlying 
Standard deviation of the firm’s 
daily stock returns at time t 
Standard  deviation  in  the 
Production Price Index  
 
As a proxy for the interest rate we have taken the benchmark bond 10y and as a proxy for the 
volatility we have chosen the standard deviation of the increments in the Price Production 
Index, since patent counts are industrial patents, while  i,t is omitted for the reasons explained 
before.  Descriptive  stats  of  the  data are  reported  in  Table  AI  in  the  appendix,  while  the 




By retrieving the FE of the estimate it is possible to rank the legal component of 
patents value for those counties included in the panel, which is an index of the value granted 
by national legal protection, Iv. The use of panel data has various advantages. Firstly, panel 
dataset generally provide an increased number of data points, generate additional degrees of 
freedom, and reduces the collinearity among explanatory variables. Secondly, FE solve the 
problem of unobservable variables in conventional OLS regression estimates, and thus allow 
more  efficient  estimation  of  the  regression  parameters  (Pindyck,  Rubinfeld,  1998;  Ernst, 
2001; Greene, 2003). Moreover, the problems arising from a possible misspecification error 
of  the  omitted  variable  form  can  be  significantly  reduced  by  incorporating  information 
relating to both cross section and time-series variables. Of course, the analysis presented in 
the paper suffers from some limitations that can possibly be overcome in further research. 
Some  explicit  attention  should  be  paid  to  the  different  technological  specialization  of 
countries, because the technological content of patents in different countries may affect the 
value of patents regardless of protection granted by law. In our analysis this aspect has been 
implicitly relegated to the unobservable heterogeneity component, accounted for by the FE 
estimate. 
The FE of the estimate are a “raw” index of the national value of patents granted by 
legal protection. They must first undergo a Wald equality test, and successively they must be 
normalized to take on values between 0 and 100. Table II reports the index based on the FE 
estimate
3 in Table AII. 
 
 
                                                 
3 On the basis of a Hausman test we can reject the null hypothesis of consistency of both fixed and random 
effect.   5 
 





Spain  0.00 
Italy  0.24 
Ireland  1.15 
Group 1 
0.00 
Norway  2.11 
Denmark  2.91 
Finland  2.97 
Belgium  3.18 
Canada  3.28 
Austria  3.33 
Group 2 
2.79 
Sweden  8.28 
Netherlands  8.28 
UK  8.28 
France  8.28 
Switzerland  8.28 
Germany  8.28 
Group 3 
9.13 
USA  79.28 
Japan  100.00 
Group 4 
100 
Source: based on OECD data 
(*) higher values of the index are associated to higher values of patent legal 
protection. The index has been normalized assigning 0 to the lowest value 
and 100 to the most virtuous country. 
 
In column 3 the seventeen countries have been gathered into four groups according to the 
results of the Wald tests on the FE. Within each group we have taken as a numerical reference 
the closest value of the FE to the next group, that is the highest value within each group is 
representative of all the countries in the group. For a total of J groups this operation has been 
repeated J-1 times, while for the J
th  group we have taken as a reference the lowest value 
within the group, in order to minimize the dispersion of the indicator between groups. Clearly, 
this normalization procedure is arbitrary, one could have chosen any other method to assign a 
unique value to the countries belonging to the same group, such as the mid value, as long as 
the choice is invariant with respect to the final ranking, the object we are really interested in. 
In the first group we find the Southern European countries (in this sense Ireland is 
considered as a Southern country) and in the fourth group we find the USA and Japan, as 
expected. The other advanced economies lie between these two bounds with some of them 
relatively  more  virtuous:  Sweden,  the  Netherlands,  the  UK,  France,  Switzerland  and 
Germany, and some  others somewhat less  virtuous:  Norway  Denmark, Finland, Belgium, 
Canada, Austria. 
EU countries substantially share a common law on intellectual property, but the degree 
of compliance and enforcement varies greatly among countries. That explains the variability 
of the index among those countries. 
The  original  procedure  we  have  followed  to  rank  the  value  that  legal  protection 
granted to patents in different countries has the twofold advantages of being theoretically 
grounded and overcoming the problem of lack of data. Nevertheless, the finding needs to be 
tested in order to assess its reliability.    6 
  A  recent  study  elaborated  on  behalf  of  the  EU  Commission
4  evaluates  through  a 
survey the value of patents in eight countries, seven of which are included in our estimates. 
Table III presents a clear comparison between the ranking stemming from the application of 
the two methodologies. 
 
Table III. Comparison between Iv and a ranking based on survey data 




Spain  1  1 
Italy  2  2 
Denmark  3  3 
Netherlands  4  6 
UK  5  4 
France  6  5 
Germany  7  7 
5DQN
&RUUHODWLRQ
0.90***   
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
(+) The report repeats the estimates over three time periods. 
In this column the average rank over the three periods is reported. 
 
The two rankings differ only for one country, The Netherlands. If we remove this non serious 
difference  the  remainder  of  the  rankings  are  exactly  the  same.  The  rank  correlation 
coefficient
5 is 90% with a degree of significance at 1%. This is a startling result showing a 
close convergence between the two methods. It shows that the real option approach applied 
on macro data can closely replicate the results obtained from survey analysis. Therefore, we 
cannot reject the ranking made in such a way. 
As a second check, one would expect higher values of patents where patent protection 
is stronger. To this purpose it is possible to correlate the patent value index, Iv, to the index of 
the strength of patent rights, PR, elaborated by Ginarte and Park
6 (1997), expecting a positive 
correlation.  By  the  same  token,  one  would  also  expect  a  positive  correlation  with  the 
enforcement index elaborated by the World Bank
7. However, since the PR is a composite 
index given by the sum of other five indices, where enforcement is only one of the five, it is 





                                                 
4  Study  on  “Evaluating  the  knowledge  economy:  what  are  patents  actually  worth?”  Available  at 
http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/indprop/docs/patent/studies/final_report_lot2_en.pdf.  The 
authors estimate the patents value through an interval estimation based on survey data with a sample of about 
8000 observations. 
5 The rank-correlation or Spearman’s rank correlation indicates how the ranks of objects in one sample differ 
from the ranks in another sample. Its values range from -1 to 1. A value of 1 indicates that the ranks are identical, 
while -1 indicates that they are exactly inverted. For more details on how to work it out and how to determine its 
significance see http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Spearman%27s_rank_correlation_coefficient 
6  The  Ginarte  and Park  index is  the  sum  of five  other  indices:  (1)  extent  of  coverage, (2)  membership  in 
international patent agreements, (4) enforcement mechanism and (5) duration of protection. 
7 The World Bank enforcement index is referred to the recovery of overdue debts and is composed of three 
indices: (i) number of procedures, (ii) time, and (iii) cost as a % of debt. See p. 107 Doing Business in 2006.   7 

Table IV. Rank correlation between Iv and the two indices of the strength of patent protection  
Rank-correlation between Iv 
and the index of patent rights, 
PR
(+) 
Rank-correlation between Iv 
and the index of 
enforcement
(++) 
0.52**  0.38* 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
(+) the Ginarte-Park index is elaborated every 5 years, this table shows the  
rank correlation between Iv and the average rank over the period 1980-2005.   
(++) the WB enforcement index is composed of three indices, the Table shows  
the rank correlation between Iv and the average rank of these three indices. 
Source: based on Ginarte, Park (1997) and World Bank, Doing Business in 2006. 
 
The  results  reported  in  Table  IV  perfectly  fulfil  our  expectations.  Both  correlations  are 
positive and significant, but the one referred to the GP index is stronger in the sense of both 
its magnitude, 52% against 38%, and its level of significance, 5% against 10%. At this point 
one  question  is worth clarifying.  It is  sensible to wonder  whether  ,
￿  is capturing a  more 
general effect, namely the quality of the legal system, rather than patents only. We know that 
by virtue of international agreements patents share the same law throughout the world and this 
is particularly true for the European countries that even share the same patent office. This 
helps us in restricting the effect captured by the indicator
8. 
  With this threefold validation of the index, one can be legitimated to take Iv as a good 




This  paper  moves  a  step  ahead  in  the  difficult  task  of  measuring  the  value  of 
innovative  output.  In  particular,  relying  on  real  option  theory  we  have  presented  a  new 
methodology to rank the value of patents granted by law in different countries, namely we 
rank  the  effectiveness  of  patent  protection  in  different  countries.  This  task  has  been 
accomplished overcoming the annoying problem of lack of renewal data or survey data.  
In  this  direction,  further  research  can  take  explicitly  into  account  the  different 
technological specialization of countries, because the technological content of patents may 
affect the value of patents regardless of protection granted by law.  
  Nevertheless, we consider that the analysis presented can be a good starting point to 
formulate sound policies in better protecting intellectual property in order to spur economic 
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Table AI: Descriptive stats of the data. 
Mean and standard deviation in parenthesis. 1977-2003 
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Source: Datastream for sigma, OECD for interest rate, triadic and  count patents. 
 
Table AII: FE estimate of equation (6) on macro data.  





























































Observations  380 
R-squared  0.92 
Robust  standard  errors  in  parentheses,  *  significant  at  10%;  **  significant  at  5%;  *** 
significant at 1% 
 
 
The Table above reports the estimate of equation (6). Perfectly in line with Wu and Tseng, 
WKHFRHIILFLHQW 4LVQRWVLJQLILFDQWO\GLIIHUHQWIURP]HURZKLOH 1 2DQG 3 take on the 
expected signs. The FE estimate has been carried out by a Leas Square Dummy Variable 
technique, instead of the more common within estimator in order to retrieve the FE for each 
country along with its significance. On the basis of a Hausman test we can reject the null 
hypothesis of consistency of both fixed and random effect. 
 
7KHDXWKRUVJUDWHIXOO\WKDQN3URIHVVRU:3DUNIRUKDYLQJSURYLGHGWKHPZLWKXSGDWHG
GDWDRQWKHLQGH[RISDWHQWSURWHFWLRQ